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ABSTRACT 
One of the crucial factors in resource economics is the 
element of time. In recent years a great many dynamic models 
have been developed in order to derive optimal decision 
rules for long-term resource policies. The assessment of the 
long-term socio-economic net benefits of resource use is 
however fraught with difficulties due to many uncertainties -
in models with a long time horizon (e.g., risk, 
multigenerational tradeoff). 
In order to take account of the uncertain or hidden 
effects of a project in a dynamic ecological-economic model 
one can either try tó adjust the costs and benefits of the 
project at hand or the social rate of discount that is used 
in the model concerned. In this paper the latter approach is 
adopted in four representative natural resource models 
pertaining to the environment, the fisheries sector, the 
forestry sector, and exhaustible resources, respectively. 
The effects that are intemalized in each model relate to 
the following classes of uncertainty: multiple generations, 
risk and uncertainty, crowding out effects, and 
externalities (and intangible effects) of the use of the 
natural resource. A sensitivity analysis on the implications 
of a non-uniform social rate of discount is undertaken for 
these four classes of uncertainties with respect to each of 
the four models used. 
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1. A Non-uniform Social Rate of Discount in Ecological-Economic Models 
One of the crucial factors in resource economics is the element of 
time. In recent years a great many dynamic models have been developed in 
order to derive optimal decision rules for long-term resource policies.^ 
The assessment óf the long-term socio-economic net benefits of resource 
use is fraught with difficulties due to many uncertainties in models 
with a long time horizon (e.g., risk, multigenerational tradeoff). 
In order to take account of the uncertain or hidden effects of a 
project in a dynamic ecological-economic model one can either try to 
adjust the costs and benefits of the project at hand or the social rate 
of discount that is used in the model concerned. In this paper the 
latter approach is adopted. In previous publications (see Gijsbers et 
al., 1986, and Gijsbers and Nijkamp, forthcoming), an extensive 
literature survey has been made of arguments for and against a varying 
social rate of discount. The literature revealed that a wide variety of 
arguments can be found, ranging from intertemporal variation to project 
specific (and even project component specific) variation of the social 
rate of discount. All these arguments will not be repeated in the 
present paper. We simply observe the existence of a diversity of 
arguments in favor of a varying social rate of discount. In this 
respect, we discern four main categories of arguments in favor of a 
non-uniform social rate of discount, viz., 
(a) the (intergenerational) equity argument 
(b) the uncertainty and risk argument 
(c) the financial crowding out argument 
(d) the externalities and intangibles argument 
Each of these 4 arguments will be discussed very briefly in the 
next section (section 2). Taking for granted the plausibility of these 
arguments, we will then in subsequent sections identify the consequences 
of using a non-uniform social rate of discount in dynamic 
ecological-economic models. The following sample ofnatural resource 
models has been selected, viz. a materials balance model, an exhaustible 
resource model, a forestry model and a fishery model. These models are 
discussed in sections 3 to 6, respectively. For each of these models we 
will analyze the sensitivity of the results for a non-uniform social 
rate of discount, based on one or more of the abovementioned four 
arguments. The paper will be concluded with a systematic review table. 
2. Four Arguments for a Varying Social Rate of Discount 
In this section, the four arguments for using non-uniform discount 
rates for public projects will be discussed in a concise manner. 
2.1 The (intergenerational) equity argument 
It is often argued that in case of long-term projects the 
government - as a 'trustee of unborn generations' - should use a social 
rate of discount that is lower than the discount rate reflecting the 
(individual) opportunity cost of postponing the consumption of goods or 
services. This is especially emphasized in case of multi-generational 
evaluation problems, as the usual social rate of discount is co-
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determined by time preferences of individuals who are neither 
necessarily concerned with future interests of themselves nor of society 
as a whole (cf. also the so-called 'isolation paradox'; see Sen, 1967). 
In the past decade the problem of multiple generations has been 
quite extensively discussed in view of the exhaustibility of natural 
resources. The argument for a downward adjustment of the social rate of 
discount is based on the assumption that individuals have a myopie view 
on the future and hence tend to underestimate the impacts of current 
decisions upon long-term welfare related to the use of a finite stock of 
resources (cf. Herfindahl and Kneese, 1974, Krutilla and Eckstein, 1958, 
Marglin, 1963, Mishan, 1977, Myers, 1977, Page, 1977,and Pearce, 1977). 
Despite many variations in arguments, it is generally accepted that the 
interest of future generations may lead to a downward adjustment of the 
social rate of discount. 
2.2 The uncertainty and risk argument 
Uncertainty and risk provide other arguments for adjusting the 
social rate of discount (cf. Arrow and Lind, 1970, Baumol, 1968, 
Haveman, 1977, Lind, 1982a,b , and Vickrey, 1964). A higher risk at the 
cost side may -then lead to an increase in the discount rate. Despite the 
Arrow-Lind theorem and the pooling argument, it is still widely believed 
that high risks of public projects may lead to a varying social rate of 
discount, particularly to avoid an artificial (and thus inefficiënt) 
reallocation of investments to the public sector. Lind (1982a,b) has 
strongly argued that it is necessary to use a non-uniform discount rate 
which is dependent on the specific risks incurred and on ways of 
financing the project concerned. 
2.3 The financial crowding-out argument 
The way of financing a project (including its impact on the 
allocation of investment funds) may provide another argument for 
advocating a varying social rate of discount. Especially the crowding-
out effect is relevant in this context: if the social rate of discount 
is not in agreement with the market rate of interest, public projects 
may be generated which have a lower profitability than those in the 
private sector (cf. Baumol, 1968, Bradford, 1975). In this respect the 
shadow price of capital may be used in order to transform costs and 
benefits of a public project into private consumption equivalents (see 
Lind, 1982b). Such a shadow price approach (eventually corrected for re-
investment opportunities) provides a plausible way of taking into 
consideration the specific impacts of a certain public project 
2.4 The extemalities and intangibles argument 
In case of intangible social costs (caused inter al ia by 
extemalities) it is of ten argued that a downward adjustment of the 
social rate of discount is necessary in order to impose a more strict 
filtering condition on such projects (cf. Baumol, 1968, Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1974, Fisher and Krutilla, 1975, Haveman, 1977, Pearce, 1983, and 
Schulze et al., 1981). Alternative approaches have been proposed among 
others by Lind (1982b) , who claims that again a shadow price may be 
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assessed for such intangibles. Also an option value approach may be 
,chosen here (Nash, 1973). It is clear that irreversibility and 
replenishability of natural resource processes are extremely important 
in this respect. In conclusion, apart from a straightforward adjustment 
of costs and benefits of such intangibles, it is in general an 
acceptable idea to adjust the social rate of discount in case of 
intangible effects of public projects. 
The overall conclusion from this section is modest, but offers an 
interesting scope for economie analysis: economie theory provides valid 
arguments to use a varying social rate of discount for public projects 
(without claiming however that a non-uniform rate of discount is a 
necessity in public project evaluatiön). The implications of this 
viewpoint for natural resource models will be further investigated in 
the next sections. 
. The foregoing presentation of 4 classes of arguments demonstrates 
that one may on plausible grounds (i.e., based on the economie 
literature) justify the use of a non-uniform social rate of discount 
that varies over different time periods, different projects or different 
effects. 
In the framework of long-term environmental management decisions, 
it is worth mentioning that the social rate of discount reflects here 
the sacrifice of current welfare in 
favor of a maintenance of future welfare including environmental goods. 
A low social rate of discount implies thus a high value attached to the 
future. It is evident that 'the abovementioned 4 classes of arguments for 
using a non-uniform discount rate apply to a large extent also to the 
evaluatiön of environmental goods in natural resource models. It is 
therefore an interesting question as to which arguments are especially 
relevant in a given environmental policy context and what consequences 
are expected from an adjustment of the social rate of discount. 
3 A Materials Balance Model 
Maeler's dynamic materials balance model describes an economy in 
which an environmental management agency guards the environmental 
quality by charging the producers and consumers with a price q, when 
they discharge wastes in the environment. ' This price is unilaterally 
determined by the agency. The other prices in the model are determined 
on markets where all producers and consumers are pricetakers. It is 
assumed that no change occurs in technology or in the size of the 
population. The model consists of the following equations: 
rT 
max W - 0J U(C,Y)e"rt dt (3.1) 
(C,Y) 
s.t. 0J f[K(t)]dt < S (3.2) 
K - I (3.3) 
' Maeler actually uses vectors of prices and goods in his model. Here 
these are treated as single variables, which does not harm the analysis. 
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C+I+/xK < f(K) (3.4) 
Y - A(1-Y)-7Z (3.5) 
Z = C+/tK (3.6) 
K(T)>KT, Y(T)>YT> K(0)=K0, Y(0)=YQ (3.7) 
with: C= rate of consumption 
Y= environmental quality 
K= capital stock 
S= maximum exploitation of the natural resource allowed 
during the planning period 
Z= total 'amount of man-made residuals discharged in 
the environment 
/i= rate of depreciation of K 
r= rate of discount * 
A, 7= p ar ame te r s 
(3.5) represents the relation between waste discharges and environmental 
quality. The term A(l - Y) is to be interpreted as the self-purification 
of the environment (investments that could change the assimilitive 
capacity of the environment are not considered). 
Using the Pontryagin maximum principle this problem can be 
restated as follows: 
H = e"rt[U+pI+5{A(l-Y)-7Z}-pr(f-S/T)-a(I+C+/iK-f)-q(C+/iK-Z)] (3.8) 
with: p = price for investments goods 
5 = price for environmental quality 
p = price for natural resources 
q = price for waste disposal services 
a = corporate profit 
The first order conditions are: 
H ' c = U ' c - a - q =0 
H'-j- = p - a = 0 
H ' z - -76+q - 0 
H ' K - - p r f ' K - a p + a f ' K - q / * - - p / p + r 
H ' Y - U ' Y -5A - -S/S+t 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
DIO 
Environmental and crowding-out effects are incorporated in this 
....•del as follows. Equation (3.9) can be interpreted in the sense that 
the marginal utility of consumption equals the opportunity cost of 
consumption, which consists of two parts: (1) the value of the omitted 
capital accumulation, and (2) the disposal cost of consumption 
residuals. According to (3.11) the latter is equal to the value of the 
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marginal decrease in the quality of the environment caused by the 
discharge of residuals. In principle the rate of discount in this model 
can be adjusted for the externalities and intangibles argument and the 
financial crowding-out argument. 
The risk argument can be applied in this model if the assumpti'on 
of perfect certainty is relaxed. Considering environmental investments 
as relatively safe investments one could argue for a downward adjustment 
of the discount rate. 
The intergenerational equity argument can be applied if the time 
horizon T exceeds the length of a generation. A reduction of the 
discount rate would •lead to a slower decline of both environmental 
quality and the stock of the natural resource concerned. Thus the four 
arguments for a non-uniform social rate of discount can be successfully 
applied in this model. 
A Dynamic Abiotic Exhaustible Resource Model 
This section focusses on the model of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) . 
This model on exhaustible resources reads as: 
max O* e"rtU(C)dt (4.1) 
(C) 
s.t. K - F(K,R) - C (4.2) 
00 
O" Rdt < SQ (4.3) 
R,S > 0, K(0) - K0, S(0) = S0 (4.4) 
with: • C = flow of consumption goods in period t 
K = stock of capital in period t 
KQ= initial stock of capital 
R « flow of the exhaustible resource in period t 
SQ= initial stock of the exhaustible resource 
r — social rate of discount 
Equation (4.1) repcesents the multiperiod control function. (4.2) 
denotes the change in the stock of capital. The production function has 
the following properties: F'K>0, F'R>0, F"KK<0, F"^^, F'^X). Equation 
(4.3) limits the accumulated usage of the exhaustible resource to the 
initial stock. The Hamiltonian of this optimal control problem is: 
H - e"rt[U(C)+p{F(K,R)-C} + (/i-e rtA)R] (4.5) 
with: p - price of a consumption good in period t 
X - present value shadow price of the exhaustible 
resource 
fi = average cost of extraction 
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It is assumed that (i > O, /JR = O, A > O, A(S.Q-0-' R dt) = O 
The first order conditions are: 
H
'c = U'C-P " ° (4-6) 
H'R - pF'R+/i-Ae r t - 0 "* ' (4.7) 
H'K = pF'K= -p+pr (4.8) 
Equation (4.8) is known in economie literature as the Ramsey rule. 
Following Dasgupta and Heal we assume that R > 0. Then equation 
(4.7) reads as follows, if an optimal program exists. 
A = e"rtpF'R (4.9) 
In order to derive the time path of R, we calculate the derivation of 
(4.9) with respect to time: 
F V F V r + p / p - ° <4-10> 
Substitution of (4.10) into (4.8) yields: 
F
'K - -FVF'R (4-U) 
This can be written as: 
R/R = -KF"RK/RF"RR+aKF'KF(K,R)/R2F"RR (4.12) 
K 
o = -RF'KF'R/F'KF(K,R) (4.13) 
K 
where o = the substitution elasticity of R and K; a < 1, because the 
resource is assumed to be essential to production (i.e. it is not 
possible to substitute completely capital for the exhaustible resource). 
The optimal time path for C follows from substitution of (4.6) in (4.8): 
-U'c/U'c = F'K-r (4.14) 
which can be rewritten as: 
r7(C)C/C - F'K-r (4.15) 
iKC) - -{CU"CC/U'C} (4.16) 
where rj(C)is the elasticity of marginal utility, and we assume that: 
Ij 
C-
0< lim »7(C) < ». 
It can be seen from (4.15) that in an optimal program the growth 
rate of consumption in this model gets negative when using a positive 
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It can be seen frorn (4.15) that in an optimal program the growth 
rate of consumption in this model gets negative when using a positive 
discount rate. This growth rate rises at a decreasing rate when using a 
discount rate equal to zero. 
For a Cobb-Douglas production function (here F(K,R) with o = 1) 
and an iso-elastic social welfare function (here U(C) with a constant f?) 
Dasgupta and Heal prove that a unique optimal program (CA,KA,RA) exists 
with the following asymptotic property: 
lim RA/RA - -r/r? (4.17) 
t-KO 
(4.17) means that given r > 0 the percentage change in the usage pace of 
R is negative in the long run for the optimal program. Further RA is 
continuous for all t > 0, RA < 0 for all t > 0, and RA < 0 for a 
starting period with large values for KQ and SQ and RA > 0 in the long 
run. This implies that the resource will not be depleted within a 
finite period of time, because lim F'.p = 7 < °° does not hold true for 
F(K,R). - K/R-** 
The introduction in this model of technological change under 
uncertainty (meaning the probability, that on a certain point in time a 
new non-reproducible resource will be discovered as a substitute for the 
old essential resource, R, is set at 1, but the time of this discovery 
is being treated as a random variable whose probability distribution is 
exogenously determined) implies. the following for the optimality 
conditions of the model if certain conditions are fulfilled. ' The 
optimality condition (4.12) remains unchanged, but in (4.15) the 
discount rate S is raised with a term ij}, that varies in time and equals 
the conditional probability, that the substitute will be discovered at 
time t given that it has not been discovered prior to t. 
The introduction of the abovementioned uncertainty in the model 
implies given the change in (4.15) that a higher rate of consumption is 
considered to be optimal than in the old model. This seems intuitively 
justified, because the resource is no longer a bottleneck for production 
in the described economy once its substitute is discovered and employed. 
Now we come to the question of whether a non-uniform discount rate 
can be applied meaningfully in this model. As the model covers a very 
long period of time and involves the social welfare of present and 
future generations, the intergenerational equity argument can certainly 
be applied in this model. The social welfare of the future generations 
can be protected by lowering the rate of discount, so that the optimal 
time paths of consumption and of the use of the non-living resource 
decline less progressively. This downward adjustment of the discount 
rate could be subjected to the probability distribution of the time of 
the discovery of the substitute: if this discovery will take place in 
the distant future, then the intermediate generations will be worse off. 
The uncertainty and risk argument has in fact been applied by the 
authors concerning the uncertainty with respect to technological change. 
The financial crowding out argument is only relevant in this model 
in as far as crowding out of future production and consumption is 
concerned. 
l)
 See Dasgupta and Heal (1974). 
rate. In order to postpone irreversible effects, that could result from 
an exhaustion of the resource ' (which could be optimal in this model, 
if one does not assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and/or an iso-
elastic social welfare function), one could postpone the time of 
exhaustion. The same procedure can be used to redress negative 
(ir)reversible environmental effects, that accompany the exploitation 
and use of this resource (and mutatis mutandis to stimulate positive 
external effects). In sum, all four arguments for a non-uniform social 
rate of discount rate can be applied effectively in this model. 
5. Dynamic Forestry Model 
In this section a dynamic economic-ecological forestry model based 
on the Faustmann formula as described by Clark (1976) is under 
investigation. The objective of the model is to determine the optimal 
rotation for a given species of tree. The commercial value, V, of a 
single tree is determined by the volume and quality of its timber. V 
depends on the age of the tree. Assuming that the curve V(t) is known, 
what is the optimal age at which to feil a tree (or more realistically a 
stand of trees of'the same age)? If c denotes the cost of felling, then 
optimizing the present value of the net value of the stand with respect 
to the felling time T, i.e., 
max PV = e"rt[V(t)-c] (5.1) 
(V) 
yields: 
V'(T) - r - 0 (5.2) 
V(T)-c 
with V = value of tree stand 
c = cost of felling 
r = social rate of discount 
Optimizing the present value for more than one rotation requires 
the inclusion of the site value (i.e. the opportunity cost of investment 
tied up in the standing trees and in the site), i.e., 
max PV - V e"kffT[V(T)-c] - V(T)-c (5.3) 
(V) k _ 1 er-l 
with respect to T yields: 
V ' m - r - O (5.4) 
V(T)-c l-e"ri' 
with c = cost oftfelling and planting 
k - rotation number 0 
' Examples may be certain medicines, for which this resource 
constitutes an indispensible ingrediënt. 
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with c = cost of feiling and planting 
k — rotation number 
Equation (5.4) can be .rewritten in the form 
V'(T) = r[V(T)-c]+r v m ^ c . . (5.5) 
e^T 
where V(T)-c represents the present value of the site value. 
"e^ï 
Equation (5.5) for the optimal rotation period T is called the Faustmann 
formula. A rise in the discount rate c.p. results in shortening the 
optimal rotation. A permanent cost reduction c.p. or a permanent rise in 
price c.p., will have the same effect. 
On the basis of what arguments can a non-uniform social rate of 
discount be applied effectively? The intergenerational equity argument 
is applicable in this model if V increases during a rotation that 
exceeds the length of a generation, say 30 years. Then a downward 
adjustment of the discount rate can bring about an optimal rotation 
where the benefits of the stand planted by one generation can accrue to 
a next generation. 
The uncertainty and risk argument could be adopted here: observing 
that the investment in the forestry project is relatively safe one can 
apply the social rate of discount that is associated with long run 
capital bonds. This would extend the optimal rotation. 
The financial crowding out argument is applicable if an assumption 
is adopted concerning the financing of the project. In the Faustmann 
formula itself the opportunity cost of the use of the land for a tree 
stand has been incorporated by adjusting the present value equation. 
Finally, the externalities and intangibles argument can be 
internalized by considering the tree stand as an environmental good of 
which the social value rises in time, and adjusting the social rate of 
discount accordingly downward so that the optimal rotation is 
lengthened. 
6 A Dynamic Fishery Model 
In this section a general dynamic fishery model developed by 
Nijkamp (1977) is examined. The model assumes that the natural growth of 
the fish stock is determined by the stock itself and by exogenous 
factors that determine the ecological environment (like the quality of 
water, and that there exists only a limited stock of total fishery 
capital in each period). It consists of the following equations: 
fT I 
max w = J e-rt[ 7 {pifi(zi,c.) - s^c^dt - (6.1) 
(zi>Ci) l i T 
s.t. zL - gi(zi,ei)-fi(zi,ci) for all i, (6.2) 
(zi>t=0 - zi (6-3) 
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c^ - c - T Cj where i*j (6.4) 
with p^ = price per unit of fish of species i 
7.: = stock of fish of species i 
c^ = capital investments of fishery sector i 
c = total capital stock of the fishery sectors 
SJ •= average capital costs per unit in sector i 
ei = exogenous factors (like water quality) 
r = social rate of discount 
f.^  = production function for harvesting fish 
g^ = biological growth function 
The corresponding Hamiltonian is equal to: 
I I I 
H - « ' " [ ^ Pifi(Zl,cj-J1 c^-s^c-^cj)] 
I .1 
l^l Ai(Si(zi.ei)-fi(zi-c:I1 cj) > ' where ii*j (6.5) 
with Xi = shadow price of a marginal unit of fish stock in 
terms of net social benefits foregone 
The necessary conditions for an interior optimum are the following: 
H V e " r t P i f i V e " r t s i + A i f i V ° <6-6> 
H
'Zi= «'"Pifi'zi^igi'zi^lfi'zi- "Ai <6-7> 
In order to derive the time paths of Zz and c- equation (6.6) is 
rewritten as follows: 
lts time derivative is: 
-Xt - e-rt[(-r(pifi'Ci-si)+pifi»CiCici+pifi"c.z.zi}fi'Ci+ 
+ < f l ' c 1 P i - S i ) f i ' c 1 - < f l " c i c 1 ° l + f l " c i z t * i > 
( P i f i ' c i - s i ) ] / ( f i ' c . ) 2 ( 6 . 9 ) 
Inserting this equation in equation (6.7), in which A^ has been 
substituted using (6.8), gives after several rewritings: 
1 1 
z i / z i - t - P l V z 1 ( f i ' c i > 2 - < 8 i ' z i - f l ' z 1 > ( P i f i ' c i - a i ) f l ' c 1 + 
'• t - r < P i f i ' c i - s i > + P i f i n c i c i c i + f i ' c i P i - s I > f i ' c i + 
-
f i " c i c i c i ( P i f i ' c i - s i ) ] / - f i " c i Z i s i z i (6-10) 
and 
t - r ( P i f i ' c i - s i ) + P i f i " c i Z i 2 i + f i ' c i P i - s i ' f l , c i + 
-
f i , , c i Z i z i < P i f i ' c i - s i ) 2 / - f i " c i c i s i - i C6.11> 
Now we can address the question of whether a non-uniform rate of 
discount can be used effectively in this model. In the model the 
intergenerational equity argument can be applied if the yearly optimal 
fish catch.of species i exceeds the maximum sustainable yield, and the 
time interval T surpasses 30 years. An upwardly adjusted discount rate 
for this species then results in a higher optimal stock of species i, if 
"<Pifi'c -si>fi'ci/-fi"cizisizi i s Positive; this is the 
case if fi'c.>si/pi,assuming that fi"c.z.>0. If fj_'c <si/pi, 
then a higher discount rate will result in a lower optimal stock of 
species i. The second case holds true for all levels of c^ if s^/p^ is 
large enough (see figure 1) . If s^/p^ is not large enough then a lower 
discount rate will result in a lower optimal stock for lower levels of 
capital investment and in a higher optimal stock for higher levels of 
capital investment af ter the point where the rising f,-' curve inter-
i c i 
sects with s-/p- line in f,-' ,c-space. The model then is at even with 
the foregoing observation in the literature that resource conservation 
is served by a lower discount rate, as long as fi'c.<si/Pi-
The financial crowding-out argument can be applied in this model if 
the assumption of a fixed capital stock of the fisheries sectors is 
dropped, and if these sectors are integrated in the natonal economy, so 
that one allows for crowding out by the fisheries sectors of investments 
in other sectors. Lowering the discount rate applied to fisheries 
sectors investments will then result in a lower optimal level of capital 
investment in these sectors if 
fi'Ci<si/Pi-
The same adjustments in the assumptions have to be made in order 
to make the risk argument applicable in this model. The observation that 
fisheries investments are relatively safe would result in a downward 
12 
adjustment of the discount rate which would however discourage 
investments in the fisheries sectors if f. ' .<s.-/p- . 
If species i is threatened, then one might consider a strong 
lowering of the discount rate applied in its fishery backed by a 
combination of the intergenerational equity, the risk, and the 
externalities and intangibles argument in order to take notion of its 
option value, if f^'C .< s i /Vi-
The discount rate of all I fish species can be lovered based upon 
the externalities and intangibles argument, if one views the fish 
population as an environmental good that increases in value in time. The 
total fish population will then rise as less fish of each species are 
caught. 
In short, each of the four described arguments for a non-uniform 
social rate of discount can be used effectively in this model. 
'7 Review of Results 
The following table gives an overview of the models discussed in 
the preceding sections with respect to the applicability of a 
non-uniform social rate of discount for each of the four above-mentioned 
arguments. This table is mainly illustrative. 
In the table a distinction has been made between the following 
aspects of the use of a non-uniform discount rate in the models: 
(i) when describing the model, the author mentions 
explicitly the effects that correspond with each 
of the four arguments. 
(ii) it is possible to adjust the discount rate in the model 
under discussion for (at least one of) the four arguments. 
(iii) an adjustment of the discount rate inspired by each 
argument has a substantial impact on the timepath of the 
natural resource concerned. 
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intergen- risk and financial externali-
erational uncer- crowding- ties and 
equity tainty out intangibles 
(i) (i) 
(ü) (ü) (ü) (ü) 
(iü) (iü) (iü) (iü) 
•rH 
. (i) 
(ü) (ü) (ü) 
(iü) (iü) (iü) 
(i) (i) (i) 
(ü) (ü) (ü) (ü) 
(iü) (iü) (iü) (iü) 
(i) (i) 
(ü) (ü) (ü) (ü) 
(iü) (iü) (iü) (iü) 
Materials Ba-
lance Model 
Maeler (1974) 
Exhaustible 
Resource Model 
Dasgupta and 
Heal (1974) 
Forestry 
Model 
Clark (1977) 
Fisheries 
Model 
Nijkamp (1977) 
In conclusion the four arguments for adopting a non-uniform social 
discount rate seem to be applicable in most cases and to have a 
substantial impact on the time path of the use of the natural resource. 
Now one can assume that a non-uniform discount rate can be adopted 
successfully in natural resource models in general. More generally, one 
might consider a procedure of evaluation using a non-uniform discount 
rate to be applicable in other policy models. 
14 
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